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REASON-GIVING IN COURT PRACTICE: DECISION-MAKERS
AT THE CROSSROADS
Mathilde Cohen*
This Article examines the thesis according to which the practice of
giving reasons for decisions is a central element of liberal
democracies. In this view, public institutions' practice-and
sometimes duty-Of reason-giving is required so that each
individual may view the state as reasonable and therefore,
according to deliberative democratic theory, legitimate. Does the
giving of reasons in actual court practice achieve these goals?
Drawing on empirical research carried out in a French
administrative court, this Article argues that, in practice, reason-
giving often falls either short of democracy or beyond democracy.
Reasons fall short of democracy in the first case because they are
transformed from a device designed to "protect" citizens from
arbitrariness into a professional norm intended to 'protect" the
judges themselves and perhaps further their career goals. In the
second case, reasons go beyond democracy because judges'
ambitions are much greater than to merely provide petitioners
with a ground for understanding and criticizing the decision: they
aim at positively-and paternalistically in some instances-
guiding people's conduct. The discussion proceeds by drawing
attention to social aspects that are often neglected in theoretical
discussions on reason-giving. A skeptical conclusion is suggested:
one can rarely guarantee that any predetermined value will be
achieved by the giving of reasons. The degree to which
individuals are empowered by the reasons given to them is
dependent on the way in which decision-givers envision their
reason-giving activity, and this representation is itself conditioned
by the social setting of the court.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Mr. M,1 I reject your petition. The deportation order does not violate your
family life. Your marriage project, if it exists, is too recent and you have many
relatives in your home country. You can appeal this decision, but the appeal is not
suspensive, which means that the prefecture will execute the deportation order.
Come closer to sign the decision.,
2
This is what Judge A announced when she returned from her deliberation. The
small courtroom dedicated to deportation hearings in the administrative court of Y
felt unusually solemn. Everyone fell silent. A tense, awkward atmosphere seized
the room. Mr. M, the young claimant who had been sitting the whole time while
awaiting the sentence, nervously tapping his shiny shoes on the floor, stood up and
approached the platform where Judge A and her clerk were standing. He was not an
ordinary illegal immigrant appealing his deportation order. The menacing presence
of three policemen, dressed in black, ostentatiously blocking the way out signaled
that he was in provisional detention. After signing the decision, he would be
escorted back to a detention center and, later on, deported to his country, by force if
necessary.
A couple of days later, when interviewed, Judge A came back to this very
distinctive moment in a judge's work when he or she must announce a decision
confirming deportation to a detained immigrant: "Humanely, it is a very difficult
moment. One just made a decision that has immediate effect, which is unusual. I try
not to formulate the decisions too dryly, I always formulate the reasons and I
indicate that he [i.e. the petitioner] can appeal the decision. I always try to
humanize, but this isn't something that is practiced by all my colleagues. 3 In Judge
A's view, reason-giving has "humanizing" effects. She might mean that reasons
help claimants accept judicial decisions. Both the decision and the process by which
the decision was reached are more likely to be accepted if the claimant is able to
judge the soundness of the decision. Reason-giving shows respect. It demonstrates
that attention has been paid to the special features of a case and the parties involved.
Yet will Mr. M feel better about being deported by virtue of learning the reasons
underlying the decision? How may the knowledge that he has not established a
' In order to protect the interviewees' identifies, this Article designates interviewees by letter
and the exact locations of the courts are not disclosed. Quotations have been translated from French into
English.
2 In French: "Monsieur M, je rejette votre requete. L 'arrt4 de reconduite & lafrontikre ne
porte pas atteinte t votre vie fainihale. Votreprojet de mariage, s'il existe, est trop r&ent et vous avez
beaucoup de faiille dans votre pays. Vous pouvez faire appel de cete dicision, mais lappeln 'est pas
suspensj e 'est-&t-dire que laprifecture va exdcuter I 'arrt. Venez signer le dispositifde la dcision."
Field Notebook, hearing presided over by Judge A, administrative court of Y, France (May 19, 2006).
3 In French: "Humainement c 'est un moment trs difficile. On vient de rendre une dcision qui
a des effets immddiats, ce qui est mnhabituel. Jessaie de ne pas dnoncer skchement la dcision,j 'nonce
toujours le mnotfetj 'indique toujours qu 'il peut faire appel ... J'essaie toujours d'humaniser, mais c 'est
pas quelque chose qui est pratiqud par tons mes collgues. " Interview with Judge A, conducted by
Vincent Braconnay and Mathilde Cohen, administrative court of Y (May 23, 2006).
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sufficiently substantial family life in France for the purposes of residency affect
him?
Judge A's declaration implicitly relies on the currently dominant justification for
reason-giving in contemporary legal and political theory, which holds that requiring
public institutions to substantiate their decisions with reasons constitutes an essential
component of a liberal democracy.4 Reasons will not necessarily make Mr. M feel
better, but he will certainly be empowered by them. Knowing the grounds of the
decision and being reminded that he can appeal are two fundamental pieces of
information that might enable him to decide whether any further action should be
undertaken. The reasons also guarantee that Judge A's decision is not arbitrary.
They act as a check on decision-makers' discretion. The offering of reasons for
judicial decisions is an important element of democratic society. Public decisions
such as judicial decisions may be imposed on citizens, but only if they are justified
on certain foundations. Reasons legitimize decisions while at the same time
providing grounds for criticism.
It is striking that Judge A immediately stressed that this practice of reason-
giving is not universal among her fellow judges from the administrative court. The
statement is surprising considering that French judges are under a statutory duty to
give reasons for their decisions.5 In fact, in most contemporary legal systems, there
is a requirement-formal or informal-for courts, administrative agencies, and other
public institutions to provide reasons for their decisions. This requirement
increasingly reaches other public and non-public institutions, including parliaments,
schools, hospitals, and corporations, to such an extent that most decision-makers
whose decisions directly affect the public are subjected to some form of a duty to
substantiate their decisions through reasoned and written statements. Perhaps what
Judge A means is not that her colleagues do not give reasons at all, but rather that
they do not give appropriate reasons or that they give reasons for the wrong
purposes. She is implying that unlike her, their goal may not be to "humanize"
decisions. They are not motivated by the desire to foster democracy. What can their
justification for reason-giving be? What difference in the formulation of the reasons
themselves can that divergent justification make?
In this Article, Judge A's popular claim that reason-giving fosters democracy is
evaluated not only on theoretical grounds, but also through empirical research. The
goal is neither to substitute one justification for reason-giving with another nor to
complete an existing justification, but to raise questions about the "democratic"
justification of reason-giving. In doing so, the paradigmatic case of courts is
reconsidered. Since the requirement of reason-giving that reigns throughout many
public institutions originated in the judicial setting, the courts seem to be an
appropriate place to revisit the issue. There is a vast literature on the legal and
4 See, e.g., GERALDF. GAuS, JUSTIFICATORY LIBERALISM (1996) (analyzing the prominent role
played by justification in liberal political theory).
5 The duty for judges to give reasons was originally introduced in French law by Title V, Article
15 of the August 16 and 24, 1790 Statute. It has been reaffirmed several times since then. The obligation
bears on all courts: civil, under Article 455 N.C.P.C; criminal, under Articles 485 & 593 C. PR. PEN; and
administrative, under Article L9 C. ADM., which states: "Judgments must be accompanied by reasons"
("Lesjugements sont motzvH').
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historical sources of the reason-giving requirement as well as on its philosophical
underpinnings,6 but little attention has been directed to the way in which decision-
makers who are subjected to such a requirement perceive it throughout their practice.
This is the reason why one must inquire into the meaning that judges confer to the
giving of reasons. Is this meaning coherent with theoretical elaborations on reason-
giving? More precisely, when giving reasons, do judges see themselves as fostering
democracy? Since the giving of reasons is a context-dependent practice, an
empirical inquiry is important and reveals attitudes that do not accord with
theoretical claims. Charles Tilly has shown that reasons arise out of situations and
roles.7 Reasons establish, repair, and negotiate relationships. This Article focuses
on a very specific kind of reason-giving in society: that of judges in a court setting.
The discussion is limited to interactions between judges, administrators, and
petitioners. While Judge A understands reasons as a way to establish, repair, and
negotiate relationships with claimants, her colleagues, according to her, give reasons
in relation to their professional environment (other judges in particular). In practice,
reason-giving often turns out to be either short of the democratic ideal or beyond it.
In other words, reason-giving requirements may "miss" the democratic ideal in two
opposed ways: because democracy is not taken seriously enough or because it is
taken too seriously. Reason-giving in court practice (as elsewhere) can be used
through aggressive obtuseness or "over-reason" that actually chases reason out of the
process.
This Article develops the preceding argument in four stages: after indicating the
research method, it then expands the main hypothesis. The Article then puts forward
two contradictory conceptions for judges' reason-giving.
II. METHOD: AN EMPIRICAL VIEWPOINT
This Article compares the democratic justification of reason-giving with judges'
understanding of the practice. The research is based on ethnographic work that was
conducted in a French administrative court in the spring of 2006, as part of a
collective survey of French administrative litigation, "Les usages sociaux de la
justice administrative" (The Social Uses of Administrative Justice), funded by the
"Droit et Justice" Group, an emanation of the French Ministry of Justice and the
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. The survey was supervised by
Professors Jean-Louis Halprin (tcole Normale Suprieure), Emmanuelle Saada
(tcole des Hautes ttudes en Sciences Sociales), Alexis Spire (Centre National de la
Recherche Scientifique) and Katia Weidenfeld (University of Caen). I was part of a
team studying administrative justice from the point of view of judges, in the
particular context of immigration litigation, while collaborating groups focused on
other actors (administrators, lawyers, claimants, etc.) and/or on other areas of
administrative law (tax litigation or housing benefit litigation). The team employed
the techniques of interviews and participant observation. Specifically, together with
Sarah Mazouz, I observed ten days of deportation hearings in an administrative court
and, with Vincent Braconnay, I interviewed seven judges using semi-directive
' See, e.g., Martin Shapiro, The Giving Reasons Requirement, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179 (1992).
See also Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633 (1995).
' CHARLES TILLY, WHY? (2006).
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interviews. The interviews were not merely biographical, but mainly aimed at
collecting judges' representations, explanations, and justifications of their practice.
We were not primarily seeking factual explanatory elements but rather their analyses
of the court's functioning.
The empirical data that were collected pertain to a special type of deportation
hearing ("audiences d'arrts prdfectoraux de reconduite 5 la fronti re," usually
known as "APRF').8  This type of proceeding is the only one in French
administrative litigation that gives rise to hearings in which all the parties involved
are present (the foreign petitioners and their counsel on one side, and the
representatives of the immigration agency, the prdfecture, on the other side) and
where each party is able to set out its case and cross-examine the other side. The
proceeding is designed to enable petitioners to appeal an order to leave the country
that has been entered by the prefecture. The procedure allows two types of
outcomes. The judge can either side with the prefecture and confirm the order
("dicision de rejet") or dismiss the order ("dicision d'annulation"), thereby
constraining the prefecture to reassess the claimant's situation and perhaps even
grant him or her a residence permit.
In France, all judges, administrative judges included, are subjected to a statutory
reason-giving requirement: they must write opinions detailing the reasons they
decided in one way or another. This requirement can be traced back to the August
16th and 24th, 1790 revolutionary statute on judicial organization, which imposed a
formal requirement on all courts to provide reasons for their decisions.9 It was
constructed on the principle a corollary of legislative sovereignty-that the
arbitrary power of the courts under the Ancien Rigime (the "Parlements") must end.
The judiciary was perceived as a corrupt and reactionary enemy of social reform.
Judges were no longer to participate in the lawmaking function, but were merely to
be the "mouthpiece of the law."10  Reasons were thought of as the ideal tool to
monitor the judges of the young Republic. 1 Requiring reasons is not unique to
France. In common law countries, the general rule is that there is no duty to state
reasons bearing on courts. 12 But this proposition is limited in two ways. First, in
many instances, the legislature imposes a statutory duty to give reasons for judicial
' The proceeding is governed by Book V, Title I (in particular, Articles L511-1 to L513 4) of
the Code de I 'entrde et du sjjour des &rangers et du droit d'asile.
' The August 16 24, 1790 Statute, Title V, Art. 15 stipulates that a judicial opinion must have
four parts, the third of which must consist of"the reasons that determined the judge" ("les motifs qui
auront dctermin le juge").
"' This expression originates from MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, Book XL, Chapter 6
(Cambridge University Press 1989).
" This interpretation is comforted by historical research on the emergence of a duty to give
reasons in French law, see, e.g., Tony Sauvel, Histoire dujugement motiv, 61 RDP 5 (1955); Pierre
Godding, Jurisprudence et motivation des sentences, du Moyen-Age & lafin du XVIIllme sicle in LA
MOTIVATION DES DECISIONS DE JUSTICE (ChaYm Perelman & Pierre Foriers, eds., 1978); and Pascal
Texier, Jalons pour une histoire de la motivation des sentences, in Travaux de rAssociation Henri
Capitant, La Motivation. Tome IL. Limoges- 1998. 5 (2000).
12 Paul P. Craig, The Common Law, Reasons and Administrative Justice, 53 CAMBRIDGE L. J.
282 (1994) ("It is a well known and oft-repeated proposition that there is no general common law duty to
furnish the reasons for a decision").
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or administrative decisions.13 Second, even though most scholars agree that there is
no formal reason-giving requirement, they argue that there is often an informal
requirement bearing on courts implicit in the legal system, manifested by the well-
entrenched custom of writing opinions, except in cases regarded as routine by
judges. 14 Most writers claim there should in fact be such a requirement because in a
democracy, it is the best legal device to protect citizens against arbitrary decision-
making.15 The duty to give reasons is also a general principle of European Union
law. Article 190 of the Treaty of Rome (now Article 253 EC) provides that
regulations, directives, and decisions adopted jointly by the European Parliament and
the Council, and such acts adopted by the Council or the Commission are to state the
reasons on which they are based. 16 The problem underlying this provision was how
to control the exercise of essentially legislative powers by agencies that do not enjoy
formal democratic legitimacy. Reasons were thought to ensure transparency and
accountability. The founding European treaties arguably introduced reason-giving
requirements as a way of conferring legitimacy upon non-majoritarian institutions.1
In the French context, the fieldwork revealed itself to be particularly relevant to
the problem of reason-giving. Deportation litigation is an expanding domain in
French administrative litigation and represents, depending on the location of the
court, between twenty and fifty percent of administrative judges' work. 18 In the
court under examination, which is located in a large city with an important foreign
population, the proportion averaged thirty percent and is increasing. The
13 For instance, in the U.S., the California Constitution (Art. 6, § 14) imposes a reasons
requirement on judicial decisions. The Administrative Procedures Act requires reasons for certain
administrative decisions (5 U.S.C. § 553 (c) (1988)). In England, the Tribunal and Inquiries Act 1958
created an obligation to give reasons for tribunals (now s.10(1) Tribunal and Inquiries Act 1992).
14 See, e.g., Michael Wells, French and American Judicial Opinions 19 YALE J. INT'L L. 81
(1994).
15 This is the position defended, among others, by Michael Akehurst, Statements of Reasons for
Judicial andAdministrative Decisions, 33 MOD. L. REV. 154 (1970); H.L. Kushner, The Right to Reasons
in Administrative Law, 24 ALTA. L. REV. 305 (1986); and Paul Robertshaw, Providing Reasons for
Administrative Decisions, 27 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 29 (1998).
" Article 253 of the EC Treaty now states: "Regulations, directives and decisions adopted
jointly by the European Parliament and the Council, and such acts adopted by the Council or the
Commission, shall state the reasons on which they are based and shall refer to any proposals or opinions
which were required to be obtained pursuant to this Treaty." Year after year, the ECJ has given an
increasingly precise definition of the duty to give reasons. For instance, in Case 87/78, Welding & Co. v.
Hauptzollamt Hambourg-Waltershof, 30 Nov., 1978, the Court held the extent of the Article 190 duty
depends on the nature of the decision in question. Case 158/80, Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft Nord mbH et
Rewe-Markt Steffen v. Hauptzollamt Kiel, 7 Jul., 1981, stands for the proposition that Article 190
requires regulations to contain a statement of the reasons which led the institution to adopt them, so as to
make possible a review by the Court and so that the member states and the nationals concerned may have
knowledge of the conditions under which the community institutions have applied the Treaty. More
recently, Case T-241/97, Stork Amsterdam BV v. Commission of the European Communities, 17 Feb.,
2000, the Court held that the obligation to state the reasons is one of the fundamental principles of
Community law which the Court has to ensure are observed if necessary by considering of its own motion
a plea of failure to fulfill that obligation.
17 See, e.g., Martin Shapiro, The Giving Reasons Requirement, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179 (1992)
(developing this interpretation of reason-giving requirements).
" The increasing weight of deportation litigation on administrative judges' workload has been
given a statistical translation in a report by Marie-Dani&le Barre, Bruno Aubusson de Cavarlay & Marta
Zimolag, Dynamique du contentieux administratif Analyse statistique de Ia demande enregistre par les
tribunaux admminstratiJs (1999-2004) 12-14 (2005).
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consideration of deportation hearings therefore requires the study of a form of
reason-giving prevalent among administrative judges. Moreover, deportation
litigation involves a class of people increasingly at the center of debates on the
claims and limitations of social democracy. Usually poor, under-informed, badly-
counseled, unaware of the subtleties of the legal system, and often facing language
barriers, foreign petitioners are especially vulnerable and dependent upon the
officials involved in their cases. For these reasons, thorough reason-giving on the
part of judges plays an essential role in immigration cases.
III. DECISION-MAKERS AT A CROSSROADS
The current literature on reason-giving insists on the virtues of reasons from the
point of view of the public, of citizens, and consumers of public services.1 9 This
analysis is consistent with the policy goals that legislatures promote by introducing
reason-giving requirements into the legal system. For instance, the French
parliamentary debate concerning the July 11, 1979 statute that (partially) extended
the duty to give reasons to administrative agencies turned on the principle that
reasons would not only promote an ideal of transparency, but would introduce
democratic practices often lacking in the traditionally secretive and sometimes
seemingly arbitrary administration. 20 Legislators conceived of the reason-giving
duty as beneficial to citizens and subjects involved in legal proceedings, despite
those (deputies or senators, law professors, experts, etc.)21 that stressed that it would
unduly burden the administration and be too costly (in time, labor, money, etc.) as
compared to the potential benefits expected for individuals dealing with
administrative agencies. The French debate illustrates the common belief in the
democratic virtues of reason-giving. The question remains whether reason-giving in
actual court practice achieves these goals.
How does reason-giving foster democracy? The connection between reason-
giving and democracy has become a commonplace in political theory and
philosophy, particularly since John Rawls's revitalizing discussion of the concept of
"public reason." 22  Under this conception, public justification is the core of
liberalism, so much so that this branch of political theory is often referred to as
"justificatory liberalism. 23  Deliberative democracy has often been described as
" This focus can be traced back to Rawls' conceptualization of the concept of"public reason,"
see, e.g., John Rawls, The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 233
(1989). The ideal of public reason is meaningless outside of a polity: it applies to citizens and public
officials when they engage in political activities in a public forum or when they vote in elections, but also
to decisions by public institutions. The value of public reasons is therefore instrumental: they are reasons
for citizens.
2" For a synthesized discussion of the French debate, see BRUNO LASSERRE, NOELLE LENOIR &
BERNARD STIRN, LA TRANSPARENCE ADMINISTRATIVE (1987).
2 For example, law Professor Georges Dupuis, a renowned specialist of French administrative
law, was never enthused by the idea of subiecting administrative agencies to a giving reasons requirement.
See George Dupuis, Les motifs des actes administratis, in 27 LTUDES ET DOCUMENTS DU CONSEIL
D'ETAT 37 (1974 1975).
22 JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason, in POLITICAL LIBERALISM 212 54 (1993), and JOHN
RAWLS, The idea of Public Reason Revisited, in COLLECTED PAPERS 573-615 (Samuel Freeman ed.,
1999).
23 GERALD F. GAUS, JUSTIFICATORY LIBERALISM: AN ESSAY ON EPISTEMOLOGY AND
POLITICAL THEORY (1996).
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affirming the need to justify decisions made by citizens and their representatives. 4
Both are expected to justify the laws they would impose on one another. In a
democracy, it is thought that decision-makers should give reasons for their decisions
and respond to the reasons that citizens give in return.25 In this way of thinking,
reason-giving is required so that each individual will view the state as reasonable and
therefore, according to deliberative democratic theory, legitimate. 26 Reason-giving
also aims to impede the arbitrary use of state power. Liberal branches of political
theory agree that the arbitrary use of state power is tyrannical and that individual
freedom requires freedom from being subjected to arbitrary state power.2' Given
that premise, one must ask how the state's power of interference can be made non-
arbitrary. Aside from traditional solutions, such as the establishment of democratic
elections, of separation of powers, or of checks and balances, one way of
accomplishing this is thought to lie in ensuring that people are able to contest state
21decisions. People must therefore have access to the reasons supporting those
decisions and be given the opportunity of contesting the soundness of those reasons.
The underlying idea is that a government does not exercise arbitrary power insofar as
it is effectively contestable. 29 This effective contestability in the political domain
requires a variety of institutions, such as courts and appeal procedures, as well as
rights to a hearing before administrative agencies.30 That said, it is doubtful whether
the giving of reasons in actual court practice achieves these goals.
All of the judges who were observed and questioned during the fieldwork
appeared to envision their giving reason practice in two primary ways. On one hand,
they endorsed the democratic analysis of reason-giving and considered their practice
of reason-giving as the ultimate way not only to respect petitioners, but also to foster
their autonomy. On the other hand, they also insisted that reason-giving is mainly an
activity directed toward the appellate court so as to avoid reversal. Five judges
occupied a position along a continuum leading from one perspective to the other and
seemed to be influenced by both to differing degrees. Two judges, F and B, claimed
to be motivated by one to the exclusion of the other. In the first approach, by giving
reasons judges aim not only at pedagogically explaining their decisions to claimants,
but at positively "helping" them by influencing their conduct. This conception is
suspiciously self-serving for judges. In reality, there is a risk that it may lead to
paternalism. In the second approach, judges use reason-giving as a tool in their
professional relationships with their colleagues and the higher court. This double
discrepancy between the practice of reason-giving and the democratic rationale was
particularly illustrated by Judge C, a senior judge, enjoying considerable authority
over both his fellow judges and the prefecture representatives, partly because he is
head of a division in the court and partly because he is a renowned specialist in
24 See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? (2004).
25 Id. (developing this view).
26 id.
21 See, e.g., PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT
(1997).
21 See Philip Pettit, Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 268
(2001) (developing this argument).
29 id.
30 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT (1999).
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immigration law and has published several well-known books on the subject. As
soon as the issue of reason-giving was raised, he exclaimed: "I over-give reasons, 3 1
a phrase he repeated several times during the discussion. But what was it exactly
that he meant by "over-giving" reasons? In relation to what was the giving an "over-
giving"? The conversation revealed that the preposition "over" could bear two
distinct meanings: it could refer to this extra attention in the writing of the opinion
that is designed to avoid reversal by the higher court or to an effort to ensure that the
foreign claimant understands the decision and can act accordingly. Reasons fall
short of the democratic ideal in the first case because they are transformed from a
device designed to "protect" users from arbitrariness into a professional norm
intended to "protect" the judges themselves and perhaps further their career goals.
In the second case, reasons go beyond democracy because the judges' ambition is
much greater than of merely providing petitioners with a ground for understanding
and criticizing the decision: they aim at positively guiding people's conduct. There
is a double shift at play, both in the first and in the second approach to reason-giving,
which is examined successively below.
IV. REASON-GIVING FALLS SHORT OF DEMOCRACY
The idea that reason-giving is a "self-protection" for judges smacks of paradox.
In principle, reason-giving is supposed to help the public (the users of public
services,) as well as other decision-makers, to understand the grounds of public
decisions and, by the same token, enable them to criticize--and to appeal, when
possible-those decisions. Institutions whose decisions may be appealed derive
from this check on their authority the obligation to provide reasons. In other words,
institutions have the obligation to give reasons because others (other institutions or
citizens) need to have grounds for criticizing them. The criticism of the outcome of
the decisions is based on the rationales in favor of that outcome. In this sense,
reason-giving has an instrumental value: a means for making it possible for citizens
and officials to challenge public decisions. This challenge can be channeled by
formal appeals procedures (e.g., for judicial decisions) or informal criticism (e.g.,
criticism of politicians' decisions in the press). The reason-giving requirement in
adjudication presupposes that one cannot criticize the outcome of a judicial decision
unless one has specific legal grounds for doing so. In order for their case to be
considered for appeal, appellants have to state a specific "cause of action." The
relevant grounds for criticism are thought to stem from the contested decisions
themselves. One has to show that the judge "erred" and thus find some flaws in her
or his reasoning.
As one adopts the judges' point of view it appears that reasons are rather
designed to prevent appeals on the part of the prefecture. During the interviews, my
first question to introduce the topic of reason-giving to the judge was usually the
following: to whom are the reasons directed? Judge A, a former high school teacher
who had only been on the bench for six months, responded, despite the fact that she
had previously argued that reasons have a humanizing function: "I would like to
" In French: "We surmotive." Interview by Vincent Braconnay, Mathilde Cohen, Axel Gabay,
Sarah Mazouz, Emmanuelle Saada, and Julie Thuilleaux with Judge C, administrative court of Y (April 6,
2006).
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answer: to the claimant, but it's a legal fiction. On the one hand, reasons are meant
for lawyers, but above all for the prefecture, especially when we are reversing its
decision.",32 Fresh out of school, A had not forgotten her lessons. She remembered
the prevailing doctrinal justification of the reason-giving requirement, i.e.,
democratically empowering petitioners by making public decisions accessible. Yet
her experience as a judge, no matter how brief, had already familiarized her with a
professional norm bearing on the court: a good judge is a judge who is not too often
overruled by the appellate court. It is well known that judges do not like being
reversed by their "superiors." The topic has become fashionable, especially in the
Law and Economics literature, which opposes traditional models of judicial
decision-making, in which it is either assumed that judges try to make the right
decision by interpreting the law correctly or that they have ideological preferences
and make policy decisions when adjudicating.33 Judges maximize their utilities and,
contrary to what the conventional viewpoint holds, they are not insulated from
external pressures and as a result their decisions are not always based upon a
disinterested understanding of the law. But what is the consequence of reversal
aversion and reputation-seeking behavior on the writing and justifying of judicial
decisions?
34
All seven of the judges interviewed mentioned, in varying degrees, that what
displeased them most was to see one of their decisions overruled as a result of an
appeal by the prefecture. This happens when they have dismissed a prefectural order
and the prefecture's legal counsel appeals their decision. Petitioners often appeal
from decisions by which a prefecture order is affirmed, but this case does not seem
to worry the judges. Why is that? Most petitioners who have adequate resources try
their luck and appeal, even though they do not have a case: this type of appeal
therefore does not usually raise doubts about judges' competence and is not
perceived as threatening. The real problem arises when the prefecture appeals, that
is, when the prefecture's representatives deem the judges too "generous" in allowing
a particular petitioner to stay in the country. In this case, it seems that the judges'
professional skills are called into question. As a consequence, an important part of
reason-giving in judicial opinions is designed to avoid precisely this possibility. As
C put it:
32 In French: "J'aimerais bien vous dire au requrant, mais 9a c 'est unefictionjuridique. Ils
s'adressent d'une part b lavocat etpuis surtout b laprfecture, surtout les cas oiz on annule." Interview
by Vincent Braconnay and Mathilde Cohen with Judge A, administrative court of Y (May 23, 2006).
33 See, e.g., Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court
Statutory Decisions With Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 263,
265 (1990); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody
Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993); and Thomas J. Miceli & Metin M. Cosgel, Reputation and
Judicial Decision-Making, 23 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 31 (1994).
3' David E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, Fear of Reversal as an Explanation of Lower Court
Compliance, 37 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 579, 580 (2003). The authors criticize the fact that reversal aversion
has become an unquestioned postulate among legal scholars studying judicial decision-making: "We do
not ask whether fear of reversal has any effect. Rather, we ask whether its effect is strong enough and
pervasive enough to explain substantial amount of compliance." The authors question the empirical
evidence that judges' decisions are influenced by the desire to avoid reversal and argue that, "Instead of
acting more cautiously in the cases that seemed to have a better chance of reaching the Supreme Court,
the judges were actually less likely to decide these cases as the Supreme Court would be expected to." Id.
at 597.
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The more you over-give reasons, the less you are appealed [by the prefecture].
In other words, you are convincing when you give reasons. When the prefecture
appeals a three-line opinion, it's easy for them to write an application for appeal.
But if it's two pages long, they must write an application responding to each
argument.35
When they reverse a prefectural order, judges give reasons not so much to
convince petitioners that they were right to contest the order, but to convince the
administration. This is typical of public law litigation: the governmental agency is
the party to convince, because it is the powerful party on which judges must exercise
checks and authority. In this process, the giving of reasons becomes a protective
device, not so much for the petitioners, but for the judges themselves. Reason-
giving plays the role of a professional norm.
Judge B discussed the full consequences of the fact that the reason-giving
requirement has become such a norm. There are tactics to fulfill this standard
quickly and efficiently (from the judge's point of view). B's strategy consists in
turning the reason-giving requirement into an organizational device of his judicial
work. Because reason-giving is so important from a professional point of view, B
chooses to dedicate most of his time to it, during the preparation of the deportation
hearings. This means that he transforms a proceeding that is, in principle, oral into a
written proceeding, whereby the essential aspects of a case are decided and put down
on an informal written record prior to the hearing. To facilitate this task, B created
for himself an electronic "reasons bank" 36 listing all the possible reasons he may
need in the various areas of law he is working with. To reduce the time he spends on
deportation hearings, while ensuring his opinions are securely justified, he has
developed the habit of systematically writing, before the hearings, decisions
rejecting the petitioner's demand. When a judge affirms a prefectural deportation
order, she or he must explain the decision exhaustively by responding to every single
argument that was raised by the claimant in his application for review. By
contrast, when a judge reverses the order, he or she only needs to develop the ground
that he or she chose for reversal and can keep silent on the other arguments
mentioned in the petition.38 Prior to the hearings, B systematically prepares rejection
35 In French: "Plus vous surmnotivez, moins vous avez d'appels. Autrement dit, vous tes
convaincant quandvous motivez. Quand laprifecturefait appeld'unjugement de trois lignes, c'est
facile de rddiger une requete en appel. S'il y a deux pages, ilfaut rdiger une requte pour repondre &t
chaque argument" Interview by Vincent Braconnay, Mathilde Cohen, Axel Gabay, Emmanuelle Saada,
Sarah Mazouz, and Julie Thuilleaux with Judge C, administrative court of Y (April 6, 2006).
31 In French: "banque de considirants." Interview with Judge B, conducted by Vincent
Braconnay and Mathilde Cohen, administrative court of Y (June 5, 2006).
3' As a general principle, when the outcome ofa judicial decision is unfavorableto claimants, the
judge's opinion must examine and refute all the grounds raised in the petitions. A decision would be infra
petita if it failed to analyze and respond to all the arguments raised in the petition. This rule has been
reaffirmed several times by the Conseil d'Etat, see, e.g., CE Ass. July 7, 1978, CROISSANT 292, AJ 1978,
p. 559, chron. 0. Dutheillet de Lamothe & Y. Robineau; CE Dec. 3, 1990, Ville dAiniens, 344, LPA June
19, 1991, p. 8, note J. Morand Deviller and more recently: CE Sect. May 23, 2001 Assoc. pour la defense
de /'environn. du pays artsien et du Limousin, CJEG 2001, p. 474, concl. F. Lamy.
31 When judges give satisfaction to petitioners, their obligations are much more limited. In virtue
of the principle of"economy of arguments" ("&conomie des inoyens"), established by the Conseil d'Etat in
CE May 29, 1963, AMaurel, p. 334, a judge can restrict him/herself to the (sole) argument that he/she takes
as a ground for the outcome of the case. As a matter of custom, only the most "enlightening"
2008]
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW
decisions, not because the petitions are doomed to fail on their merit, but purely as
an organizational device in his work. Since opinions rejecting a demand must be
more comprehensive because all the arguments raised in the petition must be
answered, B finds it easier and more practical to answer all those arguments in
advance by cutting and pasting from his reasons database. When the hearings
change his mind and convince him to grant the demand, he can simply erase the
supernumerary arguments: "It's always simpler for me to write a rejection draft
because you must answer all the arguments and it's less work afterwards." '39
B's method shows that in current practice the reason-giving requirement, far
from being a proxy for democracy within the legal system, may instead bias judicial
outcomes. Paradoxically, the requirement to give reasons creates an incentive to
reject petitions. Because rejecting a petition demands more reason-giving, it is more
"efficient," from an organizational point of view, to systematically draft rejection
decisions. Yet psychologically, one might suspect that a rejection-oriented
preparation of a case will negatively influence the final outcome. Not surprisingly,
B revealed that his "annulment rate," i.e., the percentage of the deportation orders
that he overrules, is significantly lower than the average rate for the court. B's rate
is around twenty percent whereas the entire court's rate is closer to twenty-five
percent. Judge B's "reasons bank" raises another issue: beyond not informing, does
not the question of over-informing remain? Because reason-giving has become a
quasi-mechanical task, B does not hesitate to "over-give reasons" in the sense of
listing all the possible reasons that apply in a given case. His opinions could be
described by the rhetoric of excess and superfluity, in particular by the stylistic
devices of macrologia (a longwindedness achieved by using more words than are
necessary) and hyperbole (exaggeration that is accomplished via comparisons,
similes, and a plethora of legal references). Yet what is semantically unnecessary
may in fact be rhetorically advantageous-that is, the form may have as much
impact as the content. The cut-and-paste approach can be analyzed as a bureaucratic
strategy designed to overwhelm a potential respondent who would have to respond
to every detailed argument point by point. Certainly, this has a discouraging effect
on petitioners and their counsel, who have to decipher a legal decision that has
purposefully been made obtuse. Presumably, neither has at his or her disposal a
symmetric database enumerating all the possible responses to judicial decisions on
deportation.
A further distortion comes to bear on the process as well. In principle, imposing
a reason-giving requirement on judges not only benefits the parties involved in the
litigation but, by the same token, also facilitates the higher court's exercise of its
supervisory jurisdiction. 40 The superior court exercises a supervisory power, either
by way of statute (appeal) or by its inherent powers (judicial review) over inferior
("clairant") and revealing ground of annulment is thought to be required. Cf The guidebook edited by
the Conseil d'Etat to guide judges: Guide pratique b I'usage des organismes &t caracturejuridictionne/ 10
note 1 (1975).
31 In French: "C 'est toujours plus simple pour moi defaire un projet de rejet car vous ripondez
& tons les moyens et a demande moms de travail apr~s." Interview with Judge B, conducted by Vincent
Braconnay and Mathilde Cohen, administrative court of Y (June 5, 2006).
4 See Paul P. Craig, The Common Law, Reasons and Administrative Justice, 53 CAMBRIDGE L.
J. 282 (1994) (developing this argument).
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decision-makers such as judges. In the case of French deportation hearings, the
higher court, the cour administrative d'appel, can review the administrative court's
decision through an appeals procedure. If judges provide reasons for their decisions,
then the appeals courts, when exercising their supervisory function, know why a
decision was made. Proper reasons show the relationship between the evidence and
the decision and enable the higher court to determine whether irrelevant
considerations have been taken into account. The reasoning can be generalized and
applied to any situation where an individual has a right to appeal that might be
frustrated by not being told the reasons for the decision. This explains how
something like professional honor can be involved in reason-giving. For instance,
Judge C is very proud of his reason-giving, which works for him as a form of
"label." According to him, his well-argued and thoroughly justified decisions are
famous throughout the whole district: "When the prefect of X receives a decision,
he immediately knows it's from Judge C." '41 C argues that his reason-giving skills
account for the "solidity" of his decisions in that they are only very seldom overruled
by the superior court, partly because the prefecture rarely dares to appeal.
Weaknesses of the written reasons enhance the chances of an appeal in matters of
law, while skillfully developed reasons may prevent a materially doubtful judgment
from being overturned by the court of appeal.
The transformation of the reason-giving requirement from a rule intended to
benefit claimants into a political tool within the judicial community is not an
undocumented conjecture, but was explicitly endorsed by the court's vice chancellor
("prisident de juridiction"), G. As the head of the court, G is entrusted with a
hierarchical and disciplinary role. He must assign a yearly grade to the judges in his
court (all civil servants in France are subjected to periodical grading)4' and he is in
charge of distributing bonuses. G essentially bases his assessment on the number
and nature of appeals. According to G, this is the case because the court-which
included thirty-four judges at the time of the survey-is too large to allow him to
evaluate in person the quality of the judges' work, for instance by attending
hearings, by witnessing deliberations when a decision is collective, or even by
reading sample opinions. In this situation, basing assessment on appeals appears
simple and efficient. Each time an appeal is entered against a judgment of the court,
the vice chancellor receives a copy of the application together with the copy of the
contested decision. "I must sign them, so I see the quality of the writing, whether
it's well argued and legally justified." '43 It is therefore only when a judge's decision
is being appealed before the higher court that the vice chancellor actually reads his
or her opinion and assesses his argumentation. A lower reversal rate indicates a
better judge, who deserves promotion. This fact sheds a new light on the reason-
giving requirement, as it explains why this requirement can become another
professional norm within the judiciary.
41 In French: "Quand leprifet de Xreqoit une dicision, il sait inmnediateinent que c 'est du C"
Interview with C.
42 French judges are civil servants and, as such, they are life-tenured. They do not run the risk of
being dismissed even if they behave in a way contrary to the prevailing standards among their superiors.
The only professional "sanctions" are the annual grading and bonus distribution.
" In French: "Je dois signer doncje vois la qualit4 de la redaction, si C'est bien rdig et si
juridiquement c 'estfond&." Interview with Judge G, vice chancellor of the court, conducted by Vincent
Braconnay and Mathilde Cohen, administrative court of Y (June 29, 2006).
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In theory, reason-giving should be a means of furthering democracy by
facilitating the accountability of decision-makers to the public and the legal system.
One role traditionally assigned to reason-giving is to constrain the potentially
misguided or arbitrary exercise of power, especially of judges who are not elected
and are therefore not directly accountable to citizens. Instead, in the case of reason-
giving within the context of French immigration law, reasons are crafted to preserve
professional standing and shield judges from accountability. How can the reason-
giving requirement, originally a constraint on public action, a limitation on judges'
discretion, become a tool in their hands? There is a form of contradiction, or at least,
a tension at play. Judges can coin their reasons either with a view toward furthering
their professional advancement or toward their professional duties: it is more
beneficial to their career to give reasons aimed at the appellate court but their
mission is to give reasons directed to claimants.
V. REASON-GIVING GOES BEYOND DEMOCRACY
There is a second way in which the practice of reason-giving at administrative
court Y appeared to move away from straightforward democratic justifications.
Some judges argued that the reasons they give in their opinions are mainly directed
at claimants and have pedagogical virtues. At first glance this explanation seems
perfectly consistent with the democratic rationale: citizens should be able to
understand public decisions so as to act on them. Judge E, a young judge who had
arrived in this court two years before, explained, using the same expression as C, that
he particularly "over-gives reasons" in this type of litigation because decisions must
be understandable by foreign petitioners who do not necessarily have a command of
either the language or the legal systemt. He revealed that he was especially
sensitive because his wife is a foreigner and they had been confronted with the
intricacies and harshness of the French administration while applying for her
residence permit. What had struck him most during this personal ordeal was the lack
of explanations and communication on the part of the administration throughout the
entire application process. Accordingly, he considers it to be the responsibility of
the judge not only to allow petitioners to at last "express themselves" during the
deportation hearing, but also to write clear and accessible opinions for them to
understand and eventually contest. Judge F, who shares this viewpoint, went so far
as to say that the hearings constitute a collective catharsis: "There is a hearing
catharsis. I don't want people to leave frustrated from my hearing. It's often the
first time that people can express themselves.' 45 When pressed on the issue, other
judges also tended to admit that what they initially phrased as a merely pedagogical
use of reasons is really much more ambitious. For instance, Judge C, who otherwise
prides himself for shielding his decisions from appeals by over-giving reasons,
explained that reasons also have a moral status in relation to claimants: "In this
administrative court, it takes us three to four years to judge, so handing down a
" Interview with Judge E, conducted by Vincent Braconnay and Mathilde Cohen, administrative
court of Y (June 2, 2006).
15 In French: "ly a une catharsis de / 'audience. Je veuxpas que les gens sortent demon
audience frustrs. C'estsouvent la premire fois que les gens peuvent s 'exprimer" interview with Judge
F, conducted by Vincent Braconnay and Mathilde Cohen, administrative court ofY (May 19, 2006).
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three-line opinion would be outrageous., 4 6 In his view, just as in E's, reason-giving
is a way to compensate for the failures of the administrative process and the justice
system. Judges use reasons as one of the only legal devices available to compensate,
even tentatively, for the brutality of encounters with the immigration agencies.
These interviews suggest that judges, even when they consciously adopt a
democratic justification for reason-giving, have much more in mind than merely
achieving pedagogical objectives and enabling criticism. They try to communicate
with claimants. Their goal is not only to enable petitioners to understand the
decision and appeal it, but also to show respect in their duty to petitioners. They
develop the non-instrumental rationale, arguing that petitioners are owed reasons as
part of what is owed to them as a person. One should be told what one is thought to
have done and have an opportunity to respond. This goes further than saying that
judges, as governmental agents, should remain neutral. In this view, government
agents should give reasons as a way of respecting citizens and petitioners. In doing
so, they acknowledge people as autonomous beings. Reason-giving is a mark of
respect because it implies that public institutions assume people are autonomous
beings, who can choose whether to adopt or contest those reasons. Abstaining from
reason-giving or giving inadequate reasons effectively turns what is supposed to be a
reasoned and democratic process into the issuance of binding and mysterious orders.
In this view, reason-giving is not only a passive way of respecting people, of
merely refraining from interfering. It is not only a principle of self-restraint.
Reason-giving makes heteronomy less unpalatable, to be sure, but it even aims at
fostering autonomy. We are autonomous because we are capable of intentional
action, i.e., of holding an opinion about our situation and the situation around us.
Reason-giving can increase claimants' autonomy by helping them to view their
situation more clearly. This is done in two ways. First, reason-giving, it is thought,
helps people to make better-informed choices, by having more information available,
in particular on the rules that apply to them. Second, reason-giving also opens new
courses of action and introduces new goals, which people may or may not pursue-
either way, it generates more democratic possibilities. It may lead people to discover
valuable options of which they were not previously aware. Various options appear
as a result of ethical reason-giving, which citizens and petitioners may then choose
whether to pursue or not. Reason-giving is a way to reinforce this openness. This is
why reason-giving involves respecting people's ability to conduct their lives by
helping them to do so.
For example, I witnessed a deportation hearing presided over by Judge F during
which a man who had been residing illegally in France for a couple of years was
appealing a deportation order that had been issued ten months earlier. 4' His lawyer
argued that the order constituted a violation of his "right to respect for private and
family life," in the sense of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights,
since he was living together with his (French) partner in Paris, actively taking care of
41 In French: "Dans ce tribunal adininstratj nous mettons trois-quatre ans pourjuger. Rendre
unjugement de trois lignes, c 'est scandaleux." Interview with Judge C, conducted by Vincent Braconnay,
Mathilde Cohen, Axel Gabay, Sarah Mazouz, Emmanuelle Saada, and Julie Thuilleaux, administrative
court of Y (April 6, 2006).
" Field Notebook, hearing presided over by Judge F, administrative court of Y(May 17, 2006).
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her children, and was planning to marry her. After the hearing, when interviewing
Judge F, I asked him what he had decided in this case. He answered that it had been
a hard case, because it was obvious to him that the order was indeed interfering with
the petitioner's family life. He, nevertheless, decided to affirm the deportation
because under French law, the legality of deportation orders must be assessed on the
basis of petitioners' situation on the issuing date.4' At the time the order was
entered, the petitioner had not yet moved in with his partner and was therefore
precluded from claiming violation of his right to pursue a normal family life.
However, the judge said that in this case, like in other cases of this type, he would
write a detailed opinion explaining very precisely why he had sustained the order, so
as to enable the petitioner to adapt his conduct.
49
There is a pedagogical virtue in giving reasons. They are directed to claimants.
I write for the claimant. Sometimes I write for the prefecture, but most often for the
claimant. Here, for example, I made it clear that the order is assessed at its issuing
date. To help them understand, I was careful to distinguish the issues of the family
life and of the professional life, both to have them accept something that is not easy
and to help them take a fresh start and apply again. The thing not to do is to go back
to Algeria.50
In other words, Judge F was claiming that due to the reasons given in support of
his decision, the petitioner would be able to understand that his only options were
not either to go back to his country or continue to live a clandestine life in France,
but that there could be a third way. Deportation orders expire and must be reissued
every twelve months.51 Since any new deportation order issued after his family life
had started would be illegal, he should wait for a new order to be filed against him
and then appeal it, this time with a much greater chance of reversal. The reason
given, "the legality of the deportation order is assessed on the basis of the petitioner's
situation on the day the order was issued," is the kind of explanatory reason that can
" This is the case because deportation litigation belongs to a specific category of administrative
litigation: the recourspour exc~s depouvoir. This is an annulment proceeding against an administrative
organ for exceeding its legal authority. CE, Feb. 17, 1950, Rec Lebon 110. Judges' control is strictly
limited. It excludes de novo review and second-guessing of the agency's decision. This explains why
judges are to evaluate the administrative decision based on the factual situation at the time when the
decision was made, not in light of further developments that have occurred later on and are not for the
judiciary to assess.
" This attitude, which appears to be relatively common among judges dealing with immigration
law, is made possible by the fact that a vast majority of deportation orders are not enforced. Most
petitioners simply receive a letter "inviting" them to leave the country before a fixed date and, in reality,
most stay. See, e.g., XAVIER VANDENDRIESSCHE, LE DROIT DES ETRANGERS 50 (2005) (noting an average
of 65,000 deportation orders are issued every year and only 13,000 are actually carried out. This number
of people deported is halfway to President Sarkozy's 2006 and 2007 goal of 25,000).
51 In French: "ly a une vertupddagogique aux considirants. Ca s 'adresse au requcrant. Pour
moij '4cris pour le requcrant. Des foisj '4cris pour laprefecture, inais leplus souvent pour le requdrant.
Lt par exeinplej 'ai bienpr&is que c 'hait b la date de la dicision attaque qu 'on apprcie la situation.
Pour essayer de bien leur faire comprendre,j 'ai distingu vie defainille et vie professionnelle, & lafois
pour faire accepter quelque chose qui estpas facile et &t lafois pour les aider &t rebondir pour faire une
deuxikme demande. La chose b surtoutpas faire c'est rentrer en Algerie." Interview with Judge F,
conducted by Vincent Braconnay and Mathilde Cohen, administrative court of Y (May 19, 2006).
5 Deportation orders can only be carried out within a one-year time limit, starting from the date
the immigrant was given notice of the order. This rule stems from Article L. 551-1(3) of the Code de
'entre et du sejour des trangers et du droit d'asile.
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help petitioners make choices for themselves. In contrast, not informing the
petitioner of the decision, its reasons, and the possibilities for their consideration and
possible action reflects a lack of respect for the rational basis of democracy as well
as the individual. Not informing citizens or petitioners may also in effect make the
legal process a tool of injustice that diminishes lives in the sense that people are not
in possession of the necessary means to shape and pursue their goals.
In this example, Judge F is not trying to suggest new life plans or goals, but
merely is giving information regarding the grounds upon which the court intervenes
in the petitioner's life. The trouble, however, with this way of thinking about
reason-giving as a way of enhancing people's autonomy is that it can appear
paternalistic. On the one hand, the practice of reason-giving seems to promote
autonomy by suggesting values that people can embrace as part of their decisions
about how to conduct their lives. On the other hand, in the course of this activity,
government agents might not resist the temptation to assume they know what is best
for others and impose certain values on people. "Democratic reasons" run the risk of
turning into paternalistic reasons. The accusation of paternalism may seem
excessive if one understands paternalism, in its classical sense, as coercive
interference of a person's liberty of action on the ground of the welfare or interests
of the person being coerced.52 The element of coercion is missing. Reasons, though
defended on paternalistic grounds, do not by themselves interfere with personal
liberty. Claimants are given clear information on the entire range of options they can
consider. Reasons, taken alone, do not interfere with petitioners' liberty, but such
reasons accompany judicial decisions, which may be coercively enforced, although
this is rarely the case. It seems sufficient that they might be enforced whenever
authorities so decide. The problem is that such decisions, which do interfere with
claimant's liberty, are sometimes justified by reference to their own good, happiness,
welfare, or interest.
In a hearing presided over by Judge C, a woman from western Africa, Mrs. B,
contested her deportation order on the ground that she had been residing in France
for the past twenty years. At that time, under a 1998 statute,53 irregular migrants
benefited from automatic regularization of status after they could prove ten years of
residency.5" Judge C questioned Mrs. B and her husband, who was also present:
JUDGE C: So Madam, you have been in France since 1986?
MRS. B: Yes.
52 This classical definition can be traced back to John Stuart Mill's essay, ON LIBERTY. See
JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (1859). It has been revived by Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in
MORALITY AND TIE LAW 108, (Richard A. Wasserstrom ed., 1971).
53 Law No. 98 349 of May 11, 1998, Journal Officiel de la Republique Fran aise [J.O.] [Official
Gazette of France], May 12, 1998.
5' This provision has been repealed by Law No. 2006-911 of July 24, 2006, Journal Officiel de ]a
Republique Frangaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 25, 2006, under which irregular migrants
no longer benefit from automatic regularization of status after ten years' residency in France.
Regularization now takes place on a case-by-case basis.
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JUDGE C: You have been here for twenty years. so I hope your
French is good. Well, not that it's a criterion yet. But it will come!
55
JUDGE C: Your husband is working?
MRS. B: Yes.
JUDGE C: Do you file your tax returns?
MRS. B 'S HUSBAND: (mumbles)
MR. B'S LAWYER: I don't think so.
JUDGE C: But the best proof of Madam's presence in France are the
tax returns! Why don't you file them? This is the former tax expert
speaking. Aren't there any connections between the prefecture and the tax
administration?
PREFECTURE'S COUNSEL: No, not at all.
JUDGE C: It might come some day.
PREFECTURE'S COUNSEL: Yes, maybe.
JUDGE C: No, I'm just joking."56
In this brief exchange, Judge C admonishes Mrs. B-implicitly or explicitly-
on what she ought to do: she should speak fluent French, her husband should be
employed, and they should file tax returns. Judge C is directing claimants to do
certain positive things (learning French, working, filing tax returns) but in doing so,
he is also giving reasons in advance for his decision to come. The "advices" have an
argumentative value and can be reused to justify the decision. For example, a
decision confirming Mrs. B's deportation order would probably proceed by noting
her lack of "integration" into French society, as evidenced by her poor command of
the language, and by interpreting it as a sign that she could not have been a resident
for the twenty years she claims. The argument could proceed by stressing that
neither Mrs. B nor her husband have been filing tax returns during that period, such
abstention being taken to indicate that they were not present, or at least not
continuously, in the territory.
In the judicial setting, paternalism is not necessarily defined by coercion.5' A
lesser standard suffices to characterize a mild version of paternalism in that context.
55 Judge C is alluding to the policies put forward by Mr. Sarkozy who at the time of the hearing
was pushing for the enactment of the July 24, 2006 statute. Access to both citizenship and legal residence
is now dependent on the newly defined requirements of integration. For the first time in French history, a
law explicitly states the "integration responsibilities" of immigrants. Specifically, immigrants must sign a
"welcome and integration" contract and take French language and civic courses. Before applying for
permanent residence, immigrants must accordingly prove that they are "well-integrated" into French
society.
51,In French: " Done Mine, vous tes en France depuis 1986? Oui. Ca fait 20 ans que
vous etes lb doncj'esprre que vous parlez bienfranqais. Enfin, ce n'estpas un crmtre encore. Mais Qa va
venir [ ] Monsieur travaille2 ? Oui. Vous dcclarez vos unpots? M bredouille. Je ne crois pas.
Alais la meilleureJaon de prouver la prdsence de Mine, c'est les avis dimposition Pourquoi vous ne
dclarezpas? C'est I'ancienfiscaliste quiparle. I n'y a pas de connections unpots-prefecture? Non,
du tout. Caviendrapeut-6tre un jour. Oui, peut-6tre. AXonjeplaisante." Field Notebook, hearing
presided over by Judge C, administrative court of Y (July 7, 2006).
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Paternalistic actions need not be coercive and need not involve an attempt to
interfere with the liberty of action of a person. Such actions need not even involve
an attempt to control the behavior of the person. Admonition by an official such as a
judge to act in a certain way so as to further one's supposed well-being seems
sufficient to characterize paternalism. In the administrative court of Y, such a form
of paternalism appeared in the way in which judges formulated their reasons. In the
course of explaining why claimants were not successful on the merits, judges often
introduce advice or strong recommendation to do x or y. This was particularly
evident during the hearings but is less obvious in the written opinions, arguably
because judges are reluctant to leave a record of such arguments. A whole range of
more or less paternalistic reasons are developed. The most common consist of
arguments that petitioners should not be granted a residence permit because they did
not take all the necessary steps to apply for it through the regular procedures (either
they abstained from applying altogether, or they did not approach the proper agency,
or even that they failed to complete their application). Other paternalistic reasons
recurrently surface regarding the awarding of the "carte de sijour vie priv~e et
familiale," a special residence permit that may-among other grounds-be granted
to immigrants who are the father or the mother of a child residing in France, under
the condition that the applicant "effectively contributes to the maintenance and
education of the child since his/her birth or at least since a year.",58 Inevitably, the
justification of the decision turns on the issue of whether or not the petitioner is a
good parent (from the legal standpoint). Hearings were often the opportunity for
judges to ask petitioners questions such as "Do you ever pick your son up from
school?" or "Do you ever take him over weekends?" or even "Do you ever buy
clothes for him?" Cases involving student visas also give rise to such intrusive
questioning and admonishing. The yearly renewal of visas is conditioned upon the
"real and serious character" of the studies, and is the occasion for claimants to be
reminded that they should have studied harder or gotten better grades if they wanted
to maintain their status.
There is a potential drifting into paternalism included in the democratic rationale
of reason-giving. Giving reasons specifically tailored for particular petitioners and
aiming at actively guiding them can result not in fostering their autonomy but, on the
contrary, in interfering with it. A judge may direct petitioners to act in certain ways
they may think valueless in order to become eligible for residence permits he or she
assumes they want. Learning French, being "integrated" into French society, filing
tax returns, and taking care of children in certain ways may figure among the
requirements to obtain residency but can appear preposterous to some people.
Implicit in judges' reasoning is the idea that petitioners' lives can be improved by
directing claimants into some acts even though they do not necessarily think them
valuable. The question therefore remains whether this (mild) form of paternalism is
justified under the circumstances.
5' According to Bernard Geri and Charles M. Culver paternalism is primarily defined by the
violation of moral rules. Bernard Gert & Charles M. Culver, Paternalistic Behavior, 6 PHILOSOPHY AND
PUBLIC AFFAIRS 45, 48 (1976).
5' Article L. 313-11 (6) of the Code de 1'entrde et du sejour des trangers et du droit d'asile.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The examination of the way in which these decision-makers envision their
giving of reasons is revelatory in several ways. That reason-giving is essentially a
democratic component embedded in the legal system hopefully appears doubtful at
this point. This is not to say that reasons cannot sometimes achieve an important
democratic function, but that this happy result is a contingent matter. Reason-giving
is a practice highly dependent upon context. In this sense, normative and empirical
questions pertaining to the requirement to give reasons are often intertwined. The
determination of whether reasons are valuable is dependent upon the circumstances
of their formulation. Insufficient reasons may hurt claimants. Too many reasons
can also be a hindrance. This Article has aimed at illustrating this mixing with
concrete examples. Of course, in the conformation of the hypothesis, one cannot
draw general conclusions from a reduced number of interviews and observations, but
again one can hardly ever guarantee that any predetermined value will be achieved
by the giving of reasons. This skeptical conclusion particularly seems to apply to the
democratic justification. In practice, the degree to which individuals are empowered
by the reasons given them is dependent upon the way in which decision-givers
envision their reason-giving activity, and this representation is itself conditioned by
the social setting of the court. In other words, it would be an overstatement to argue
in unqualified terms that the reason-giving requirement fosters democracy or is an
essential component of liberal democracy. Far from aspiring to rebut the democratic
justification, the empirical research helps enrich the discussion of the reason-giving
requirement by drawing attention to social aspects that are often neglected in
theoretical discussions.
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